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 I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 When the doyen of the intellectual history of evidence scholarship, 
 William Twining, was at a comparatively early stage of his 
 explorations, he concluded that, despite its many strengths, a number of 
 charges could be made against orthodox evidence literature. First, it 
 was too narrow, focusing almost exclusively on the rules of 
 admissibility. Second, it was atheoretical, as most discussions were 
 conducted within an assumed common-sense empiricism. Third, it was 
 incoherent, as the conceptual framework of legal doctrine did not 
 provide an adequate basis for establishing links with other discourses. 
 Finally, it led to distortions and misperceptions of key evidentiary 
 issues.[1] Writing over ten years later in 1990, however, he considered 
 that these charges needed to be qualified.[2] He reckoned he had been too 
 harsh about some of the earlier literature: that the charges did not apply 
 to the early giants in the field, such as Bentham, Thayer, and Wigmore. 
 But he also acknowledged that the scene had dramatically changed with 
 the advent of the "new evidence scholarship." 
  
 This term, "new evidence scholarship," is one that would seem to 
 be susceptible to rather different uses and as such is liable to lead to 
 some confusion. As Roger Park has pointed out,[3] one might infer from 
 the inclusiveness of the term that its boundaries cannot be precisely 
 defined. On this usage, the "new" evidence scholarship can be equated 
 with all that is relatively "new" in evidence scholarship. On the other 
 hand, it can be equated, as Park says, with the more specific study of the 
 
  
 
* Professor of Public Law, Queen's University, Belfast, Ireland. 
 
 1. W. Twining, Goodbye to Lewis Elliot: The Academic Lawyer as Scholar, 15 
 JOURNAL OF THE SOCIETY OF PUBLIC TEACHERS OF LAW 2 (1980). 
 2. W. TWINING, RETHINKING EVIDENCE: EXPLORATORY ESSAYS 349 (1990). 
 3. See Roger Park, Evidence Scholarship, Old and New, 75 MINN. L. REV. 849 (1991). 
 
[893] 
  
science of proof, making use of logic, mathematics, and probability 
 theory. Twining considered that a widely held American perception 
confined the term to the latter context, but that if one opened one's eyes 
 globally to all recent writing about evidence in law, the term could 
 embrace the many varied strands of multi-disciplinary interest in the 
 subject of evidence-that is, all that took evidence beyond its traditional 
 focus on legal doctrine.[4]   These headings included procedural 
 scholarship, sociological studies of legal institutions, inference, studies 
 of discourse, including semiotics and narratological approaches, 
 psychological research, forensic science, and historical inquiries. Ten 
 years after Twining compiled this list, one might now add feminist 
 approaches to evidence and law and economics. It is true that the 
 literature under each of these headings has not been evenly spread. 
 There has been much more emphasis in the United States on, say, 
 inferential processes, social psychology and forensic science than on 
 comparative, sociological and historical approaches. It is also true that 
 some of the literature under some of these headings is not particularly 
 new. Wigmore took an important step towards broadening the study of 
 evidence to consider the logic of proof with the publication of his first 
 edition of the Principles of Judicial Proof back in 1913.[5] Literature on 
 the psychology of proof can be traced back to the early twentieth 
 century.[6] There is also nothing new about the idea that legal scholarship 
 should make use of insights and methods from other disciplines. As 
 Park has said, this debate was won by the Legal Realists as far back as 
 the 1920's.[7] What can be said, however, is that evidence scholars across 
 the common law world came rather late to this realization, as compared 
 with other legal scholars, and that what is new within evidence 
 scholarship is a much greater readiness to embrace interdisciplinary 
 approaches. 
  
 Looking at the state of evidence scholarship today, the charges 
 mounted by Twining against evidence scholarship in 1980 seem even 
 less appropriate. Evidence scholarship has ranged far beyond legal 
 doctrine. It has been much concerned with theory, particularly with 
 theoretical models, and it has been informed by a very wide range of 
 disciplines, from social psychology, forensic philosophy, mathematics, 
 
 
 
4. See TWINING, supra note 2, at 350. 
5. See JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, THE PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL PROOF, As GIVEN 
BY LOGIC, PSYCHOLOGY AND GENERAL EXPERIENCE (1913).                                                                                          
6. See, e.g., HUGO MUENSTERBERG, ON THE WITNESS STAND: ESSAYS IN 
PSYCHOLOGY AND CRIME (1908).                               7. See Park, supra note 3, at 849. 
  
 
 
 linguistics, to economics. At a recent conference on "New Perspectives 
 on Evidence," Richard Friedman commented on the eclectic nature of 
 the approaches taken in recent evidence scholarship.[8] The conference 
 appeared to concentrate mostly on three particular perspectives-the 
 empirical, the economic, and the epistemological-but Friedman did not 
 wish to exclude other approaches, and he suggested that comparative 
 and historical perspectives also had much to offer. 
  
With such a rich display of disciplinary approaches now taken 
 towards evidence law and the process of legal proof, it might seem as if 
 all is rosy in the evidence scholarship garden. The suffocating weeds of 
 a particular type of doctrinal scholarship in the ascendancy from the 
 mid- to late-twentieth century, which Rick Lempert has described as 
 following the model of "What's wrong with the twenty-ninth exception 
 to the hearsay rule?," have been supplanted by a wide variety of garden 
 flowers.[9]  It has been argued that some of the early debates on 
 probability theory threatened to stifle the promising new ground with 
 arid disputes about hypothetical cases set in an artificial world of 
 rodeos, gatecrashers, and blue and green buses.[10]    Some of this 
 scholarship seemed to have little relevance to the real world of practice. 
 
 But with the benefit of other disciplines, such as social psychology and 
 cognitive science, evidence scholarship became less transfixed by the 
 competing claims of rival theories of probability. The benefit of other 
 disciplines has thus allowed scholars to turn their attention towards 
 considering the use that their models have for shedding light on the 
 processes of actual proof and legal doctrine. This has generated some 
 sharp debates and tensions, most recently about the degree to which 
 formal models of reasoning have practical use for reasoning about 
 evidence, and for the processes of proof,[11] but there is little doubt that 
 evidence scholarship has been considerably energized and enriched as a 
 result. 
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 II. THE RATIONALIST TRADITION OF EVIDENCE SCHOLARSHIP 
  
 The question remains whether this eclecticism is as broad and 
 wide-ranging in approach as it appears to be. One way of answering 
 this question is to ask whether recent evidence scholarship continues to 
 remain set within the parameters which Twining identified as the 
 rationalist tenets of evidence scholarship.[12] Twining summarized these 
 tenets in the form of two models, or ideal types: one was a rationalist 
 model of adjudication, and the other identified the main epistemological 
 assumptions of standard evidence discourse. The model of adjudication 
 which he idealized was one whereby the direct end of adjudicative law 
 was rectitude of decision through accurate determination of past facts, 
 which proved to specified standards of probability on the basis of 
 careful weighing of evidence. This model was predicated on a number 
 of assumptions of evidence discourse which formed the basis of the 
 second model: epistemology is cognitivist rather than skeptical; a 
 correspondence theory of truth is preferred to a coherence theory; and 
 the particular conception of rationality found its expression in the 
 English empirical tradition of Bacon, Locke, and John Stuart Mill. 
 Within the broad rationalist tradition, Twining concedes that there is 
 room for differences of perspective. Thus, while many writers have 
 been relatively complacent about the extent to which the rationalist 
 model of adjudication is realized within existing practices and 
 procedures, some, including some of the best known, such as Bentham, 
 have been highly critical of the arrangements existing in their day. All, 
 however, have been what Twining calls "optimistic rationalists" in the 
 sense that they believed that rationalist standards represented a feasible 
 aspiration, rather than a remote Utopian ideal. A further point which he 
 developed is that there is a distinction between adherence to the core 
 tenets of the rationalist tradition, the importance of rectitude in securing 
 justice under the law, and adherence to particular conceptions of truth, 
 justice, and reason, which he accepts have been deeply contested in 
 philosophy.[13] 
 
 Looking at the broad range of modem evidence scholarship, it may 
 be said that few have challenged the core tenets of the rationalist 
 tradition. It is true that there have been wide-ranging debates on models 
 of decision making, and some of these would seem to stray quite far 
 from the rather simplistic or naive assumptions of the English empirical 
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 tradition. It has been argued that the kinds of models of decision 
 making developed by Pennington and Hastie, which have deployed 
 narrative stories or schemas to think about evidence, have marked a 
 shift away from the type of atomistic, inductive reasoning associated 
 with empiricism towards a more holistic mode of reasoning.[14] This may 
 require new conceptions of rationality, but it does not entail any 
 fundamental challenge to the core beliefs in truth, reason, and justice. 
 Indeed, these alternative conceptions of rationality are put forward on 
 the assumption that they represent a better explanation of our reasoning 
 processes. Moreover, while most would seem to be both aspirational 
 and relatively optimistic in their rationalist framework, evidence 
 scholars have often been highly critical of existing rules.[15] A number 
 have also adopted a more skeptical and sophisticated view on the 
 abilities of fact finders to come to correct conclusions and more readily 
 accept than evidence scholars in the past that biases creep into decision 
 making processes. A number of feminist writers, for example, have 
 argued that juries use cultural paradigms about rape which are often 
 mythical to assess victims' stories in rape cases, and that evidentiary 
 doctrine has reinforced and perpetuated such assumptions.[16] Again, it 
 would seem that many of these writers believe that there are ways of 
 combating the cultural stereotypes that often dominate our reasoning 
 processes. Some have specifically endorsed the use of greater social 
 science evidence in this endeavor.[17] 
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III. CRITIQUES OF THE RATIONALIST TRADITION 
 If we accept that the new evidence scholarship remains 
 fundamentally attached to the core tenets of truth, reason and justice, 
 and to the optimism that has underlain these beliefs, a further question is 
 whether this attachment is unduly limiting and distorting its focus. It is 
 possible to identify two broad critiques that have been made against the 
 rationalist tradition of evidence scholarship.  The first critique, 
 developed by Donald Nicolson, is that the new evidence scholarship is 
 failing to engage with fundamental challenges to the rationalist tradition 
 manifested in philosophy, the humanities, and the sciences.[18] This 
 raises two questions. The first question is whether these challenges are 
 as fundamental as is claimed. Writing some twenty years ago, Twining 
 claimed that when much of this literature is analyzed, few are able to 
 maintain philosophical skepticism.[19] Professor Damaska, however, has 
 taken the view that influential currents of contemporary thought have 
 posited a radical disjunction of language from external reference.[20] The 
 second question, however, is whatever the importance of post-modem 
 conceptions of truth and knowledge - and some modern philosophers 
 have been critical of them [21] - what relevance are these to evidence 
 scholarship which is contextualized within law. Damaska has pointed 
 out that as long as we engage in social practices such as adjudication, 
 we presuppose a world outside our statements, in which there is a reality 
 outside language and that "post-modem" thought is therefore of little 
 use in evidence law.[22]   The difficulty in sustaining a truly anti- 
 foundationalist position in this context is illustrated by Nicolson 
 himself. On the one hand, Nicolson denies that there are absolute                
foundations for knowledge - objectively valid or invalid arguments - 
 but, on the other hand, says that this does not mean there are no strong 
 or weak arguments, or that some arguments are more coherent than 
 others. One strategy he adopts to sustain this position is to claim that 
 arguments make sense within a particular shared understanding. But 
 when we claim that there has been a miscarriage of justice within the 
 practice of adjudication, we invariably want to appeal to more than just 
 what the community thinks; we want to say that there are good reasons 
  
18. See D. Nicolson, Truth, Reason and Justice: Epistemology and Politics in 
 Evidence Discourse, 57 MOD. L. REV. 726 (1994). 
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 for claiming that there have been miscarriages of justice even if the 
 community disagrees with us. 
  
 The second critique of the rationalist tradition is, I would 
 contend, a more penetrating one. This is to question how important 
 truth finding is within adjudication. In an insightful article, Mike Seigel 
 argued that the rationalist tradition has suffered from the "twin vices" of 
 foundational rationalism (the pursuit of accuracy) and logical positivism 
 (finding answers through scientific and in particular social-scientific 
 pursuits).[23] Foundational rationalism, in particular, has caused evidence 
 scholarship to suffer from both "macro-distortion" and "micro- 
 distortion." Macro-distortion has artificially narrowed the scope of 
 debates by ignoring non-rationalist values such as the acceptability of 
 verdicts and the need for efficient resolution of disputes.   Micro- 
 distortion has resulted in evidence scholars failing to see many 
 evidence-related issues outside of the contested trial. It is important not 
 to read too much into this critique. Seigel himself is at pains to stress 
 that he is not arguing that truth finding is an unimportant goal, and 
 neither does he appear to argue that social science evidence cannot help 
 to illuminate evidentiary discourse. At the same time, he does seem to 
 question the key rationalist tenet identified by Twining that the direct 
 end of adjudication is rectitude of outcome. 
  
 There are two aspects to Seigel's critique. First, is it true that 
 evidence scholars have largely ignored values other than truth finding in 
 adjudication? Secondly, if so, is this neglect a limitation? To come to 
 the first question, Seigel developed his critique within a broad American 
 context, and within this context he has convincingly argued that much 
 evidence scholarship has largely ignored other values. Exceptions 
 include Nesson's acceptability thesis which, as Seigel has pointed out, 
 was subjected to considerable criticism by evidence scholars,[24] 
 Friedman's work on the value of the confrontation right,[25] and 
 Leonard's work on character evidence suggesting that permitting the 
 defendant to offer character evidence serves the "cathartic" function of 
 trials.[26] This neglect of non-truth values is not necessarily because, as 
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 Seigel appears to suggest, evidence scholars consider them unimportant, 
 but because they have shown little interest in them. Ron Allen, for 
 example, has produced a litany of truth's competitors in the legal 
 system.[27] Referring to a list provided by a conference at Hastings 
 College of the Law on 'Truth and its Rivals,' which included speed and 
 efficiency of adjudication, protection of privacy, promoting party 
 satisfaction, public acceptance of verdicts, and achieving catharsis, he 
 added a number of variable objectives which key players such as the 
 parties, state bureaucrats, lawyers and the media want out of it, and 
 stated that each of these has programmatic implications for the rules of 
 evidence. He then added, however, that this was not what he wished to 
 discuss as he was "personally more interested" in the concept of truth.[28] 
  
 The second question whether the emphasis on truth finding is a 
 limitation depends on where one comes from. It can be argued that the 
 multi-disciplinary approach of much evidence scholarship has been 
 largely beneficial. To the extent that truth finding remains a commonly 
 accepted goal of adjudication, insight into our reasoning processes is 
 surely valuable. If this focus has artificially narrowed the scope of 
 debates-the danger of macro-distortion-then clearly this has been a 
 limitation. But these insights nevertheless may help to inform a key, if 
 not the key, objective of adjudication. Similarly, evidence scholars may 
 have focused unduly on the contested trial and this may have meant that 
 they have not contributed to debates about other dispute processes as 
 much as might have been desirable.   Seigel points to Alternative 
 Dispute Resolution ("ADR") issues in the United States. One could 
 also point to the rise of restorative justice schemes outside the formal 
 criminal process in a range of common law jurisdictions, and the rise in 
 the importance of judicial inquiries in a number of common law 
 countries where, increasingly, issues which give rise to public 
 concern-for example, child abuse within care homes, fatal accidents on 
 the railways, secret payments to politicians and fatal shootings by 
 security forces are being exposed to public inquiries.    These 
 developments are controversial. Lawyers have argued that extra-legal 
 processes can subvert legal values. Historians have argued that the 
 increasing lawyerization of inquiries can serve to legitimize political 
 versions of the truth. No doubt evidence scholars have much to 
 contribute to these developments, but does this mean that the work they 
 have been doing is necessarily limited? There is certainly plenty of 
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 other work evidence scholars could be doing, both in terms of exploring 
 the relationship between rectitude of decision, and other values in 
 adjudication, and in terms of paying more attention to the specific 
 dispute-resolving contexts in which reasoning about evidence takes 
 place. When one takes a global look at evidence scholarship, however, 
 there are signs that evidence scholars are becoming more interested in 
 this kind of work. 
 
IV. SOCIOLOGICAL, HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE    
PERSPECTIVES IN EVIDENCE SCHOLARSHIP 
 
 One reason for the neglect of non-truth values within American 
 evidence scholarship is suggested when one looks at evidence 
 scholarship from a comparative vantage point outside the United States. 
 Evidence scholarship is taught in the United States across the civil- 
 criminal divide, but largely outside a constitutional framework. In other 
 common law countries, however, the decline of the jury has opened up a 
 sharp divide in evidence teaching between the civil and criminal 
 context. Civil evidence is largely disappearing and being absorbed 
 within civil procedure, a subject which is not commonly taught in the 
 undergraduate law curriculum. This has meant that many standard 
 evidence courses have focused largely on evidence within the criminal 
 context, with increasing emphasis on the relationship between criminal 
 evidence and the values of the criminal justice system. This absorption 
 of the subject into the context of criminal justice has forced evidence 
 scholars in the Commonwealth to confront issues of fairness, rights, and 
 legitimacy perhaps more directly in their evidence scholarship than their 
 American counterparts.[29] In his Principles of Criminal Evidence written 
 in 1989, for example, Adrian Zuckerman identified three general 
 principles: the principle of truth finding; the principle of protecting the 
 innocent from conviction; and the principle of maintaining high 
 standards of property in the criminal process.[30] More recently, in his 
 Law of Evidence, Ian Dennis has argued that the goal of the adjudicative 
 process is legitimacy, and not factual accuracy.[31] 
 
 Much of this scholarship has remained firmly within the realm of 
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 30. See ADRIAN ZUCKERMAN, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 6-7 (1989). 
 31. See I. H. DENNIS, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE Chp. 2 (1999). 
  
  
 doctrinal discourse. Writing in the early 1990's, Park suggested that 
 one reason why evidence scholars turned away from doctrinal analysis 
 in the United States was because of the lack of doctrinal change.[32] 
 Conversely, however, evidence scholars in the United Kingdom, and 
 elsewhere in Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa, have had to cope 
 with a barrage of legislation, law reform reports, and constitutional 
 decisions on the law of evidence. This has kept many evidence scholars 
 busy. At the same time, another trend has come to influence a number 
 of scholars working within the field of evidence and procedure, namely 
 the rise in socio-legal scholarship. Described by the Director of the 
 Oxford Socio-Legal Centre as the "study of law and legal institutions 
 from the perspectives of the social sciences," this "movement" has come 
 more to mean for legal scholars an engagement with a "social" context 
 whether sociological, historical, economic, geographical or whatever.[33] 
 There is little doubt that the significance of this phenomenon has been 
 considerable, at least within the United Kingdom, where the Economic 
 and Social Research Council reported in 1994 that over the previous 
 twenty years the socio-legal community had produced a substantial 
 body of knowledge about the operation and effect of law in society.[34] 
 The report identified 265 academics involved in funding socio-legal 
 research, two thirds of whom were based in forty-six law departments. 
 The U.K. Socio-Legal Studies Association has risen steadily since 1990, 
 and there are a number of successful academic journals, such as the 
 Journal of Law and Society and Social and Legal Studies, with similar 
 journals in Canada and Australia. 
 It is not surprising, perhaps, that this movement should have 
 influenced evidence scholars and those working broadly in the field of 
 evidence and legal procedure. Within the last thirty years, a number of 
 historical and socio-legal examinations have been made of legal 
 processes of proof, including the role of the legal profession in the 
 development of the rules of criminal evidence;[35] the interaction between 
 scientific experts, lawyers and the rules of evidence;[36] the construction 
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of cases by the police and prosecutors;[37] lawyer-client interaction in the 
 police station and at court, and the construction of defense strategies;[38] 
 the negotiation and settlement of personal injury claims;[39] the 
 presentation of cases before judges as compared to juries;[40] and the 
 interaction of the media and law in constructions of truth.[41] 
 From a wider comparative angle, then, Seigel's criticism of modem 
 evidence scholarship seems less pertinent than it may be in the U.S. 
 context. What we see when a wider lens is applied to certain recent 
 evidence scholarship is a trend away from the rather naive optimistic 
 rationalism of traditional evidence scholarship, and towards a more 
 sophisticated and realist critique of the role of truth in legal processes. 
 One of the shifts that has taken place is to recognize the importance of 
 pre-trial proof processes. Twining himself has long pointed out that one 
 of the limitations of the orthodox evidence literature was its trial- 
 centeredness, pointing out that this skews the way in which most cases 
 are actually disposed of.[42]  One of the concepts that has had 
 considerable mileage in much of the socio-legal literature has been that 
 of "case construction." As one of the originators of the concept in the 
 context of criminal justice literature has put it, "evidence, the facts of 
 the case, strong and weak cases are not simply self-evident absolutes; 
 they are the end-product of a process which organizes and selects the 
 available 'facts' and constructs cases for and in the courtroom.[43] One 
 criticism of this approach is that the theoretical aspects about these 
 claims have been somewhat under-developed. Mike Redmayne has 
 pointed out that, at one level, the idea that cases have to be built is pretty 
 unremarkable.[44] Of course, in this process fact finders may fall into 
 error as a result of cognitive biases. But this does not mean that the 
 cases constructed have no foundation in reality. Where it may make 
 
37. See DOREEN J. MCBARNET, CONVICTION (1981); M. MCCONVILLE, ET AL., 
THE CASE FOR THE PROSECUTION: POLICE SUSPECTS AND THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF CRIMINALITY (1981). 
38. See MIKE MCCONVILLE, ET AL., STANDING ACCUSED: THE ORGANIZATION 
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PERSONAL INJURIES (1987). 
40. See JOHN JACKSON & SEAN DORAN, JUDGE WITHOUT JURY: ADVERSARY 
TRIALS IN THE DIPLOCK SYSTEM (1995). 
41. See R. NOBLES & D. SCHIFF, UNDERSTANDING MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE 
 (2000). 
42. See generally TWINING, supra note 2, at 153. 
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 sense to talk about a stronger form of constructionism, than simply one 
 of building cases, is where an interactive process takes place between 
 the police and witnesses or suspects, or between the prosecution and the 
 defense, which   results in evidence being created and    labeled. 
 Confessions are created through a process of questioning which results 
 in legal categories, such as 'recklessness' or 'theft' being suggested or 
 adopted by suspects. Some types of evidence are more susceptible to 
 this kind of construction than others. It is difficult, for example, to talk 
 about physical evidence being constructed. However, another form of 
 constructionism which socio-legal studies have emphasized is that cases 
 get built upon goals which can inject motivational bias into the process. 
 As a line of inquiry hones in upon a suspect, time is invested in making 
 a case against him or her which can lead to the neglect of other lines of 
 inquiry and even the suppression of items of information. Miscarriages 
 of justice involving forensic evidence have highlighted how even 
 forensic scientists can be imbued by motivational biases as well as 
 cognitive biases, a theme that has been developed in much of the 
 constructionist literature in science studies.[45] 
 
 More recently, scholars have turned to other theories to point to the 
 problems in achieving rectitude of outcome in the legal process. While 
 constructionism has focused on the role that actors play within the 
 system in constructing reality, other work relying on autopoietic 
 systems theory has suggested that the legal system itself is an important 
 forum for giving authority to certain kinds of evidence and truths as it 
 seeks to provide closure to the issues under examination. This need for 
 closure is problematic because it means that truth may be compromised 
 as inflated, or even fictional, claims are made for the methods of proof 
 deployed or for the conclusions reached. The tension between finality 
 and truth opens up what has been described as a "tragic choice" within 
 the very nature of the legal process: admit the possibility of error and 
 confidence is undermined within the legal process; refuse to concede 
 error and confidence may be undermined from without.[46] At the same 
 time, the prize of finality makes the legal forum a tempting arena for 
 powerful interests to seek legitimacy for their actions and pursuits. 
 Much of this socio-legal and historical evidence literature is in its 
 infancy. Within a U.K. context, Twining has declared that socio-legal 
 studies as a whole are coming of age and achieving critical mass, but 
 
45. See, e.g., BARRY BARNES, ET AL., SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE: A 
SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1996). 
46. See generally NOBLES & SCHIFF, supra note 41. 
  
 that they are approaching a critical point when they could either 
 continue to develop or decline. In the United States, social psychology 
 would seem to have had more influence on evidence scholars than 
 sociology. At the same time, there have been calls for more attention to 
 be given to both historical and comparative approaches, and it would 
 seem that the increasing problems of expert evidence and the impact of 
 Daubert is leading some scholars to look historically and comparatively 
 at the relationship between law and science. Recent work by Jennifer 
 Mnookin on the history of handwriting has illustrated how the courts 
 themselves not only determine issues of guilt or liability, but also affect 
 general conceptions of what counts as knowledge.[47] The courtroom, she 
 argues, may serve as a "kind of epistemological public space." This 
 argument has repercussions for the increasing use of judicial inquiries at 
 a national and international level to adjudicate on different versions of 
 the truth. At the international level, considerable thought is being given 
 to the role of the new international criminal court, and to truth 
 commissions as means of bringing closure to armed conflicts. Within 
 the comparative field, Damaska's work on the institutional foundations 
 of evidence law rules shines out as a fairly solitary beacon of light.[48] As 
 the importance of expert evidence grows in a number of jurisdictions, 
 however, there may be a greater willingness to look at comparative 
 experience. David Bernstein has argued that experience elsewhere 
 suggests that it may be less profitable to focus on rules of admissibility 
 as a means of controlling "junk" science than to consider improvements 
 in the procedural arrangements governing the generation of expert 
 evidence in the first place.[49] No doubt comparative scholarship may 
 yield other insights in the future. 
  
V. CONCLUSION 
 
 Bernstein has argued that one of the advantages of studying 
 controversies surrounding scientific evidence in other common law 
 jurisdictions is that scholars can relinquish their own "ideological 
 baggage" and gain insight into unanswered questions.[50] This, it is 
 
 47. See Jennifer L. Mnookin, Scripting Expertise: The History of Handwriting 
 Identification Evidence and the Judicial Construction of Reliability, 87 VA. L. REV. 
 1723 (2001). 
 48. See, e.g., MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT (1997). 
 49. See David E. Bernstein, Junk Science in the United States and the 
 Commonwealth, 21 YALE J. INT'L L. 123 (1996). 
 50. See id. 
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 suggested, may be the general virtue of the branch of evidence 
 scholarship  which  may  be  called  sociological, historical, and 
 comparative. I have argued that the rationalist tradition is very much 
 alive and well within modem evidence scholarship. Multidisciplinary 
 approaches have provided much instructive insight within this tradition. 
 As Twining conceded, however, this tradition brings its own ideological 
 baggage. The giants of evidence scholarship fought hard to erase the 
 more complacent tendencies of the rationalist tradition. One of the 
 advantages of socio-legal scholarship is that it has raised doubts about 
 some of its more optimistic tendencies. It is too early to say whether 
 this shift away from optimistic rationalism will come to provide a more 
 mainstream challenge to the rationalist tradition. Some constructionist 
 theorists suggest that the construction of cases is so dependent on the 
 interests of the actors involved that facts and evidence play little 
 constraining role.[51] Others, whose approach has been influenced by 
 autopoiesis theory, have criticized the rationalist tradition in the belief 
 that the ideas of truth and fairness exceed what the legal system can 
 hope to deliver.  However, the extent to which the theories of 
 constructionism or autopoiesis constrain facts and evidence is unclear, 
 and these theories are in need of considerable refinement and 
 development. At most, perhaps what this literature has shown is that 
 there are inevitable constraints on truth finding in legal processes. As a 
 corrective against the dominant optimism of the rationalist tradition, this 
 branch of scholarship deserves a place in the garden of modern evidence 
 scholarship, and can contribute to its general health and rosiness. 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
51. Jones, for example, suggests that even scientific facts are "negotiated 
 constructs," supra note 36, at 273. 
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